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Courts reviewing proposed mergers of nonprofit hospitals have too often 
abandoned the bedrock principles of antitrust law, failing to pay heed to the 
most elemental hallmarks of socially beneficial competition.  This Article sug-
gests that courts’ misapplication of antitrust law in these cases reflects a failure 
to understand the structural details of the American health care market.  After 
reviewing recent cases in which courts have rejected challenges to proposed merg-
ers between nonprofit hospitals, it documents how courts have engaged in a 
faulty analysis that ultimately protects nonprofit hospitals from the rigors of 
standard antitrust scrutiny.  It then identifies the core principles of antitrust 
law—preventing supracompetitive prices, optimizing output, and maximizing 
allocative efficiency—that have been absent from, if not violated by, the rulings 
in these merger cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, courts reviewing proposed mergers of nonprofit 
hospitals have abandoned the bedrock principles of antitrust law.  The 
hallmarks of socially beneficial competition—maximizing allocative 
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efficiency and total surplus—are absent from their analysis.  Not sur-
prisingly, this trend has yielded a string of cases in which antitrust en-
forcers have lost challenges to proposed mergers that courts likely 
would have prohibited had they occurred in other industries.1  This 
string of losses has troubled many antitrust policymakers,2 causing 
some to wonder whether the core principles of competition law are 
being forsaken in favor of political expedience and favorable predis-
positions toward the health care sector.3  One knowledgeable com-
mentator has suggested that “the role of antitrust law in monitoring 
the health care industry faces an increasingly uncertain, and perhaps 
diminishing, future.”4
The futility of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department 
of Justice (DOJ) challenges in federal courts has caught the attention 
1 See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. 
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000), amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302-03 (W.D. 
Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); United 
States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 
107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997); Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 
(1994). 
2 See, e.g., William M. Sage, Protecting Competition and Consumers:  A Conversation with 
Timothy J. Muris, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 101, 103 (quoting the former 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission as saying, “In hospital merger cases, the 
government is zero for the last seven.  I don’t know the specifics of every case, but 
what’s striking is the zero.  I can certainly accept the idea that the government should 
not have won them all.  But it seems very unlikely the government should have lost 
them all.”). 
3 See James F. Blumstein, The Application of Antitrust Doctrine to the Healthcare Indus-
try:  The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 IND. L. REV. 91, 111, 112 
(1998) (arguing that some approaches to mergers of nonprofit hospitals “abandon[] 
reliance on the structural guarantees of a competitive marketplace in favor of reliance 
on alternative mechanisms” and that such an “analysis is really driven by normative 
rather than empirical concerns”); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust?  The 
Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 185, 
187, 188 (discussing the apparent “judicial disdain” for applying traditional antitrust 
principles to health care providers, as well as the outright “rejection of conventional 
norms that guide competition law” in decisions reviewing hospital mergers). 
4 Greaney, supra note 3, at 185; see also id. at 193 (“Case law has constrained en-
forcers’ ability to control concentration and has given overly permissive signals to pro-
viders who are contemplating further consolidation.”).  Additional erosion of antitrust 
scrutiny is attributable to state legislatures.  In the early 1990s, eighteen states enacted 
programs to “provide an exemption from state antitrust laws and also provide immu-
nity from federal antitrust enforcement under the state action immunity doctrine.”  
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE:  FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST AC-
TIONS CONCERNING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 11 (1994). 
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of many scholars and has prompted a search for explanations.  Some 
scholars have concluded that, as a general matter, courts do not want 
competition in the health care sector and prefer instead to entrust 
benevolent monopolists to act in the community’s best interests.  They 
thus delegate health care allocations to paternalistic hospitals rather 
than empower consumers to motivate the competitive process.5  
Alarmed by judicial declarations such as “[i]n the real world, hospitals 
are in the business of saving lives, and managed care organizations are 
in the business of saving dollars,”6 commentators in this camp con-
clude that the hospital merger cases amount to a carve-out of antitrust 
enforcement and “present some of the most serious and successful 
challenges to traditional economic presumptions that can be found 
anywhere in contemporary antitrust law.”7
Other scholars attribute the losing streak to the complexity of 
hospital merger cases and the subsequent likelihood that judges will 
make mistakes in various steps of the legal analysis.8  Determining the 
relevant geographic and product markets, for example, requires sig-
nificant technical sophistication and commonly leads to judicial er-
ror.9  Courts have also tended to underestimate a merged facility’s 
5 See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the 
Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 614-15 (2002) (“In [hospital merger] cases, antitrust 
courts occasionally veer towards heresy, explicitly questioning the desirability of com-
petition . . . .”).  For this reason, Martin Gaynor has urged antitrust enforcers who liti-
gate such cases to advance rudimentary objectives to the judge and jury by articulating 
“convincing arguments about . . . the desirability of competition in health care mar-
kets” and that “monopoly harms health care consumers just like it harms the consum-
ers of conventional products.”  Martin Gaynor, Why Don’t Courts Treat Hospitals Like 
Tanks for Liquefied Gasses?  Some Reflections on Health Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 497, 502 (2006). 
6 Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302. 
7 Hammer & Sage, supra note 5, at 616.  Hammer and Sage go on to suggest that 
courts’ aversion to applying antitrust principles to nonprofit hospitals might be attrib-
utable to natural sympathies that federal judges have for those who run health care 
organizations.  See id. at 617 (“The small, elite club of individuals from which hospitals 
draw their boards of trustees shares much with the privileged pool from which most 
federal district court judges emerge.”). 
8 See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier:  Hospital Mergers and 
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 192 (1997) (“[C]ourts deciding hospital merger 
cases are asked to make exceedingly fine-tuned appraisals of complex economic rela-
tionships. . . . Like pilots landing at night aboard an aircraft carrier, courts are aiming 
for a target that is small, shifting and poorly illuminated.”); Jennifer R. Conners, 
Comment, A Critical Misdiagnosis:  How Courts Underestimate the Anticompetitive Implica-
tions of Hospital Mergers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 543, 562 (2003) (arguing that courts have erred 
in, inter alia, defining product and geographic markets and estimating market power). 
9 See, e.g., Cory S. Capps et al., Antitrust Policy and Hospital Mergers:  Recommendations 
for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 677, 679-80 (2002) (criticizing a method 
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market power.10  In addition, recent decisions suggest that many 
courts fail to understand the nature of nonprice competition, such 
that a concern about escalating health care costs leads to an interpre-
tation of duplicative investments in technologies as socially wasteful, 
rather than as a reflection of robust competition on quality.11
However, although some judges may be hostile toward competi-
tion in the health care industry, and even if the requisite antitrust 
analysis in these cases is difficult, the inability of courts to properly 
apply antitrust law in these cases reflects a more fundamental, and ar-
guably more troubling, problem:  a failure to understand how the 
structure of the American health care sector shapes market competi-
tion. 
The most important features of the U.S. health care system in-
clude the financing of care through insurance, a tax system that sub-
sidizes health insurance, a legal and regulatory system that tends to 
require all “medically necessary” care, and a reliance on private non-
profit institutions to provide care to the indigent, technological inno-
vation, and other public goods.  These features are critical in under-
standing the market for health care, and they accordingly shape a 
proper antitrust analysis.  However, because courts have not ade-
quately recognized the economic significance of these structural fea-
tures, they have misunderstood the dangers of market power in the 
health care sector and have thus inappropriately relaxed the standards 
of antitrust law. 
This Article attempts to refocus hospital merger review on the 
foundations of antitrust law.  It begins with a review of recent cases in 
which the FTC and DOJ unsuccessfully challenged proposed mergers 
between nonprofit hospitals, documenting how courts have engaged 
in a faulty analysis that ultimately protects nonprofit hospitals from 
the rigors of standard antitrust scrutiny.  The Article then identifies 
bedrock principles of antitrust law—preventing supracompetitive 
prices, optimizing output, and maximizing allocative efficiency—that 
commonly used by courts to assess market power); Gregory J. Werden, The Limited Rele-
vance of Patient Migration Data in Market Delineation for Hospital Merger Cases, 8 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 363, 363, 376 (1989) (attributing discrepancies in court decisions to difficulties 
“delineating the geographic scope of markets”); Matthew Reiffer, Note, Antitrust Impli-
cations in Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 27 J. LEGIS. 187, 192 (2001) (lamenting that judicial 
analyses of market definition are often “derived primarily from ‘guesswork’”). 
10 James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46 
ANTITRUST BULL. 299, 323-24 (2001). 
11 Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions:  Price and Non-
Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 755 (1999). 
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have been absent from, if not violated by, the rulings in these merger 
cases. 
I.  THE SETTING:  COURTS’ PROTECTION OF NONPROFITS 
There is little dispute that when courts are asked to evaluate the 
potential benefits and harms of nonprofit market power, they are ad-
dressing issues of substantial policy importance.  Rising health care 
costs are a matter of national alarm, and increasing attention has been 
paid to the growing market power accumulated by health care provid-
ers.  Recent studies suggest that market power pervades the health 
care sector and is responsible for a torrent of supracompetitive—and 
even supramonopoly—prices.12  Moreover, much of the recent rise in 
health care costs is directly attributable to increases in supply-side 
market power that are products of hospital consolidations and the 
growth of provider collaborations.13  Antitrust agencies, which are 
12 See Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices, 
HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 175, 179 (finding that “most consolidating hospitals 
raise prices by more than the median price increase in their markets”); Katharine Levit 
et al., Health Spending Rebound Continues in 2002, HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 147, 
155 (ascribing rising costs, in part, to hospitals’ growing market power).  For a detailed 
study of growing market concentration in the health insurance sector, see AM. MED. 
ASS’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE:  A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF U.S. MAR-
KETS:  2007 UPDATE (2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/ 
mm/368/compstudy_52006.pdf, and for a discussion of the related increase in prices, 
see James C. Robinson, Consolidation and the Transformation of Competition in Health In-
surance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 11, 17, 19 (empirically showing the “consoli-
dation of the [health insurance] industry at the hands of the largest health plans,” as 
well as the fact that from 2000 through 2003, “health plans . . . were able to raise prices 
consistently above the rate of growth in costs”).  This evidence has been sufficient to 
convince the FTC that “increased hospital concentration is associated with increased 
prices.”  See FTC & DOJ, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE:  A DOSE OF COMPETITION, ch. 3, at 
10-16 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694.pdf 
[hereinafter A DOSE OF COMPETITION]. 
 For a brief overview of commonly identified sources of rising health care expendi-
tures, see HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION 39 (1991) (attributing 
rising expenditures to the stimulation of demand through third-party payment, rising 
provider compensation, the aging of the American population, malpractice litigation, 
and especially the growth of expensive new technologies). 
13 See Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, Competition Among Hospitals, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 764, 764 (2003) (“During the second half of the 1990s, a dramatic wave of hos-
pital consolidation occurred in the United States. . . . [M]any local markets, including 
quite a few large cities such as Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, have come to 
be dominated by two or three large hospital systems.  Not surprisingly, many health 
plans have complained about rising prices as a result of this consolidation.”); Gaynor, 
supra note 5, at 498-99 (documenting that the median and mean Herfindahl-
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empowered by the Clayton Act to investigate and challenge in federal 
court mergers that would lead to anticompetitive consequences,14 ap-
propriately identified growing hospital market power as an enforce-
ment priority.  As the merger wave of the 1990s spread to hospitals, 
federal and state antitrust policymakers mustered a number of ambi-
tious challenges to proposed mergers of nonprofit hospitals.15
However laudable these enforcement efforts were, antitrust en-
forcement agencies have found little success, losing each of the seven 
suits initiated since 1994 to challenge proposed hospital mergers.16  
Antitrust scholars have already spilled significant ink criticizing the 
judicial reasoning and outcomes in those cases.17  However, retracing 
the development of these cases illustrates not only how the courts 
erred, but also how they became mistakenly preoccupied with a nar-
row legal question, how that preoccupation developed into a whole-
sale exemption, and how antitrust enforcers inadvertently fueled the 
mistaken emphasis.  The narrow question that preoccupied the courts 
in each of these cases was whether nonprofits, especially when enjoy-
ing market power, exhibited pricing behavior that was statistically dif-
ferent from that of for-profit hospitals.  While the question is poten-
tially of great importance, since a nonprofit’s failure to capitalize on 
market power (as for-profits are presumed to do) might militate 
against rigorous antitrust enforcement, its answer does not reveal 
whether nonprofits decline to exercise market power, which is the 
Hirschmann Index (HHI) for U.S. hospital markets rose steadily from 1985 to 2000, 
with a “very concentrated” mean HHI of 3995 in 2000). 
 It is a matter of additional concern that substantial evidence suggests that these 
mergers produced price increases that far outweighed their alleged efficiencies.  On 
the price-increasing effects of mergers and consolidations, see DAVID DRANOVE, THE 
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 122 (2000) (“I have asked many 
providers why they wanted to merge.  Although publicly they all invoked the synergies 
mantra, virtually everyone stated privately that the main reason for merging was to 
avoid competition and/or obtain market power.”); Jack Zwanziger & Cathleen 
Mooney, Has Price Competition Changed Hospital Revenues and Expenses in New York?, 42 
INQUIRY 183, 190 (2005) (finding that mergers undermined price- and cost-reducing 
effects of hospital competition following deregulation).  Hospital mergers have also 
limited the ability of insurers to reduce prices.  See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS:  MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 57 (2005) (noting that insurers’ use of selective 
contracting “has been limited by both hospital consolidation and consumers’ reluc-
tance to accept limitations on their choice of providers”). 
14 See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). 
15 See supra note 1. 
16 See supra note 1; see also A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 1. 
17 See, e.g., Capps & Dranove, supra note 12, at 180; Greaney, supra note 8, at 220; 
Greaney, supra note 3, at 193; Hammer & Sage, supra note 5, at 617. 
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central concern in merger cases.  Nonetheless, by myopically focusing 
on whether corporate form has any statistical significance at all, courts 
absolved nonprofits from appropriate scrutiny. 
Antitrust agencies had little reason to believe that courts in the 
1990s would be so unreceptive to their merger challenges, since ear-
lier courts were skeptical of carving out an antitrust exemption for 
nonprofit hospitals.  In an important 1986 decision, Judge Richard 
Posner remarked, “The adoption of the nonprofit form does not 
change human nature, as the courts have recognized in rejecting an 
implicit antitrust exemption for nonprofit enterprises.”18  Judge Pos-
ner then went further, suggesting that nonprofits might even be more 
likely than for-profits to charge supracompetitive prices and engage in 
anticompetitive conduct:  “[C]ompelled as they are to treat charity 
cases while minimizing the cost to the taxpayers of supporting the 
hospital, public hospitals are under added pressure to charge high 
prices to their paying (or insured) patients, which may make collusion 
particularly attractive to these hospitals.”19
A subsequent ruling from Judge Posner, in another FTC-
challenged merger four years later, reiterated the same skepticism to-
ward treating nonprofits differently from other hospitals:  “We are 
aware of no evidence—and the defendants present none, only argu-
ment—that nonprofit suppliers of goods or services are more likely to 
compete vigorously than profit-making suppliers.  Most people do not 
like to compete, and will seek ways of avoiding competition by agree-
ment tacit or explicit . . . .”20  One year later, Judge Gerald Tjoflat ex-
pressed the same inclination to impose the antitrust laws with equal 
18 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing NCAA v. 
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984); Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit 
Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1447, 1465 (1980)). 
19 Id. at 1391. 
20 United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).  
Judge Posner also reiterated that nonprofits are likely to pose greater danger to com-
petition than for-profits, adding, 
The ideology of nonprofit enterprise is cooperative rather than competitive.  
If the managers of nonprofit enterprises are less likely to strain after that last 
penny of profit, they may be less prone to engage in profit-maximizing collu-
sion but by the same token less prone to engage in profit-maximizing compe-
tition. 
Id.  Judge Frank Easterbrook similarly presumed that nonprofits would exploit market 
power if presented with the opportunity.  See Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., 
Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340-41 (7th Cir. 1986) (remanding a Sherman Act section 2 claim 
to determine whether nonprofit defendants had sufficient market power to shift costs 
to rivals). 
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rigor on both nonprofits and for-profits.  Citing both of Judge Pos-
ner’s opinions, Judge Tjoflat concluded that “the nonprofit status of 
the acquiring firm will not, by itself, help a defendant overcome the 
presumption of illegality.”21
These remarks, intended merely to subject nonprofits to the de-
mands of antitrust law, may have inadvertently introduced the ques-
tion of whether nonprofit hospitals’ competitive strategies differed 
from those of for-profits.  That question was seized upon in more re-
cent antitrust court rulings, in which courts have expressed a far more 
generous attitude toward nonprofit hospitals.22  The first antitrust 
opinion to take this position in recent decades was the 1989 ruling in 
United States v. Carilion Health System.23  In rejecting the FTC’s chal-
lenge to the proposed merger between nonprofit hospitals, the court 
ruled that the merger would improve the efficiency of both hospitals 
and thus would “strengthen, rather than reduce, competition.”24  The 
court then continued, 
Defendants’ nonprofit status also militates in favor of finding their com-
bination reasonable.  Defendants’ boards of directors both include busi-
ness leaders who can be expected to demand that the institutions use the 
savings achieved through the merger to reduce hospital charges . . . . 
[T]he court concludes that [defendants’] nonprofit status weighs in fa-
vor of their merger’s being reasonable.
25
21 FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991).  Judge Tjoflat 
also invoked NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984), in concluding that 
“the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that nonprofit corporations act under 
such a different set of incentives than for-profit corporations that they are entitled to 
an implicit exemption from the antitrust laws.”  Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1224. 
22 Richard Schmalbeck observes that nonprofit hospitals enjoy a similar generosity 
from tax courts and IRS rulings.  Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Tax-Exempt 
Status:  The Supply-Side Subsidies, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 121, 126. 
23 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, No. 89-2625, 1989 WL 157282, at *4 
(4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989). 
24 Id. at 849. 
25 Id.  To reach this conclusion, the court relied on expert testimony to arrive at 
two key factual findings that favored the defendants.  First, the court concluded that 
“as a general rule hospital rates are lower, the fewer the number of hospitals in an 
area”—in other words, nonprofit market concentration is correlated with lower prices.  
Id. at 846.  And second, “charitable, nonprofit hospitals tend to charge lower rates than 
for-profit hospitals,” suggesting that nonprofits do not utilize market power like for-
profits.  Id.  The court offered little analysis explaining how it arrived at these conclu-
sions but mentioned in a footnote that the FTC’s expert witness, who predicted that 
the merger would increase prices, “did not explain the basis of his findings to the 
court’s satisfaction,” and that the defendants’ witness “raised serious questions about 
[the FTC’s] method of analysis.”  Id. at 846 n.6. 
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The neutral observer might consider this statement largely in-
nocuous—particularly since the court provided many bases for its de-
cision that did not rely on the merging entities’ tax status and since 
the court based its analysis predominantly on the definition of the 
hospitals’ geographic market.26  Moreover, when the Fourth Circuit 
upheld the lower court’s ruling, it did so in an unpublished opinion 
that did not mention the district judge’s assertion that boards will re-
strain a nonprofit’s managers from capitalizing on market power.27  
But the issue emerged again in 1995, in FTC v. Freeman Hospital.28  
This case, like Carilion, involved a proposed merger of two nonprofit 
hospitals in which the parties disputed (among other issues) the geo-
graphic and product markets.29  Without citing Carilion, the court 
reached an almost identical, though more sweeping, conclusion re-
garding the significance of the hospitals’ corporate form: 
Arguably, a private nonprofit hospital that is sponsored and directed by 
the local community is similar to a consumer cooperative.  It is highly 
unlikely that a cooperative will arbitrarily raise prices merely to earn 
higher profits because the owners of such an organization are also its 
consumers.  Similarly, if a nonprofit organization is controlled by the 
very people who depend on it for service, there is no rational economic 
incentive for such an organization to raise its prices to the monopoly 
level even if it has the power to do so.
30
In applying this principle to the merging entities and approving the 
merger, the court concluded that “it would not be in [the defen-
dants’] best economic interest to permit prices to rise beyond a nor-
mal competitive level.”31
26 See id. at 847-48. 
27 See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., No. 89-2625, 1989 WL 157282 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 29, 1989). 
28 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995). 
29 Under the FTC’s alternative market definitions, the proposed merger would 
create a market with an HHI between 2288 and 4356.  Id. at 1222.  The hospitals ar-
gued that the merger would result in an HHI between 1322 and 1624.  Id.  Under the 
Department of Justice’s merger guidelines, a market is not “highly concentrated” until 
the HHI reaches 1800.  1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 
41,558 (Sept. 10, 1992). 
30 Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1222 (citations omitted). 
31 Id. at 1227.  In asking “who controls the hospitals,” the court revealed that 
twelve of the board’s eighteen members were owners, employees, or retirees of local 
businesses and concluded that “the vast majority of the combined Board of Trustees is 
comprised of persons who indirectly represent the interests of hospital consumers.”  Id. 
at 1222-23.  It is questionable, of course, whether employers adequately represent the 
interests of their employees as health care consumers since employees ultimately pay 
for the cost of health insurance.  See infra note 43. 
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Even though Freeman issued a sweeping generalization about the 
nature of nonprofit-hospital pricing policies, its conclusion, like Caril-
ion’s, did not rest exclusively on the nonprofit status of the merged 
entity, and instead primarily relied on the defendants’ market defini-
tions.  Moreover, also like Carilion, the Freeman ruling was upheld in a 
brief circuit opinion that did not discuss the relevance of nonprofit 
status to competitive behavior.32  The Freeman opinion was, however, 
distinct from Carilion in that it introduced some scholarship to sup-
port its characterization of nonprofits.  The court cited33 William 
Lynk’s Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis, which con-
cluded that “nonprofit hospitals behave differently than for-profit 
hospitals.  In particular, . . . nonprofit hospitals set lower prices than 
otherwise comparable for-profit hospitals.”34  Nonetheless, since the 
nonprofit’s pricing behavior was not central to the court’s determina-
tion, the court’s musings into the nature of nonprofits appeared to be 
little more than insignificant dicta.  But the language in Freeman—like 
the proverbial “loaded weapon”35—became available to subsequent 
courts reviewing mergers in which a nonprofit’s pricing behavior was a 
critical issue.36
32 See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).  The court briefly con-
firmed that the hospitals’ nonprofit status did not defeat the FTC’s jurisdiction in the 
case.  Id. at 266-67. 
33 Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1222. 
34 William J. Lynk, Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis, 39 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 363, 372 (1994).  Lynk explains these findings through the lens of “prop-
erty rights”:  because the primary “property right” of for-profit firms—the investor’s 
individual share—is not present in the nonprofit, the incentive to maximize the value 
of that share is absent.  Though the paper does not present any original empirical find-
ings, and thus does not provide support for a particular theory of pricing behavior, 
Lynk argues that the survey of prior research is sufficient to challenge those who be-
lieve that nonprofits maximize like other hospitals.  Economists and antitrust policy-
makers, therefore, should at least hesitate before presuming that maximizing share-
holder value—and the associated behaviors of seeking profit-maximizing prices—
drives nonprofit behavior.  Id. at 366-70. 
35 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (“The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”). 
36 It appears that the Freeman opinion did not immediately capture widespread at-
tention.  In United States v. Mercy Health Services, another challenge to a proposed 
merger of two nonprofit hospitals, the court wrote, 
The hospitals have also asserted as a defense their non-profit status and pro-
competitive intent.  The hospitals cite United States v. Carilion Health Sys. for 
the proposition that the non-profit status of the hospitals can be considered in 
determining whether the hospitals would act in an anticompetitive manner.  
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Such a proposed merger arose in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.37  
Butterworth was also a challenge to a proposed merger between two 
nonprofit hospitals, but unlike the rulings in Carilion and Freeman, the 
Butterworth court accepted the FTC’s market definition and agreed 
that the resulting hospital market would be highly concentrated.38  
Nonetheless, the court permitted the merger after concluding that 
“nonprofit hospitals do not operate in the same manner as profit 
maximizing businesses.”39  And in so deciding, the court cited the ex-
cerpt from Freeman, quoted above, that analogized a nonprofit hospi-
tal to a consumer cooperative.40
In a lengthy opinion, the court supported its distinction between 
for-profits and nonprofits on two separate but interrelated grounds.  
First, relying on scholarship and expert testimony from William 
Lynk,41 the court concluded that for nonprofit hospitals, “market con-
The government points out, this is a questionable legal proposition.  No other 
courts have explicitly adopted this theory of defense. 
902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citation omitted), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 
632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997). 
37 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 
(6th Cir. July 8, 1997). 
38 See id. at 1294.  For general acute inpatient care, the post-merger HHI would be 
between 2767 and 4521, reflecting a gain of 1064 to 1889 points as a result of the 
merger.  For primary inpatient care, the post-merger HHI would range from 4506 to 
5079, reflecting a gain of 1675 to 2001 points.  The court concluded that “the pro-
posed merger would result in a significant increase in the concentration of power in 
two relevant markets, and produce an entity controlling an undue percentage share of 
each of those markets.”  Id.  For concentration standards under the Department of Jus-
tice’s merger guidelines, see 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 
41,558 (Sept. 10, 1992). 
39 Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97. 
40 Id. at 1296 (citing FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo. 
1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
41 The Butterworth court cited Lynk’s article, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exer-
cise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437 (1995), which examines 1989 pricing data from 
a cross-section of California hospitals to determine whether nonprofits price lower 
than for-profits.  946 F. Supp. at 1296.  The article finds that “nonprofit hospitals, 
whether private or public, have statistically significantly lower list and net prices than 
for-profit hospitals.”  Lynk, supra, at 449-52.  It also determines that nonprofit hospitals 
exhibit a lower association between market share and price, and that for-profit hospi-
tals (and government hospitals) tend to raise their prices following a merger while 
nonprofit hospitals tend to slightly reduce theirs.  Id. at 459.  The article concludes 
that “we should think twice before assessing both for-profit and nonprofit hospital 
mergers with the same ex ante presumptions about their probable effects on price.”  
Id.  The Butterworth court also relied on Lynk’s expert testimony analyzing the Grand 
Rapids hospital market that included the merging parties, in which Lynk “concluded 
that in Michigan, too, higher hospital concentration is associated with lower nonprofit 
hospital prices.”  946 F. Supp. at 1295. 
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centration appears to be positively correlated not with higher prices, 
but with lower prices.”42  And second, it determined that “the in-
volvement of prominent community and business leaders on the 
boards of [both] hospitals can be expected to bring real accountabil-
ity to price structuring,” especially since those leaders have “employ-
ees [who] depend on these facilities for services [and] have demon-
strated their genuine commitment to serve the greater Grand Rapids 
community.”43  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision for the hospi-
tals in a terse, unpublished per curiam ruling, concluding that “[t]he 
record presented here does not leave us with a firm conviction that 
the district court erred in its analysis of the facts.”44
The Butterworth opinion was a sweeping victory for nonprofit hos-
pitals because it carved out a different standard for nonprofits in the 
application of antitrust laws.  It also sparked some heated academic 
commentary.  One leading antitrust scholar called the ruling a “rejec-
tion of conventional norms that guide competition law” and a deci-
sion that “turned antitrust law on its head.”45  Another critic charged 
42 946 F. Supp. at 1296.  Lynk uses nearly identical language, concluding from his 
study of California hospital markets that “on balance increased nonprofit market share 
is associated with lower, not higher, prices.”  Lynk, supra note 41, at 459. 
43 946 F. Supp. at 1297, 1302.  To reach this conclusion, the court gave significant 
weight to a “Community Commitment” that the hospitals signed, which pledged to 
freeze certain prices, limit profit margins, and maintain a commitment to serve the 
medically needy.  The pledge was designed “‘to assuage any purchaser concerns and to 
reiterate [the hospitals’] strong conviction that the purpose and intent of the transac-
tion is to reduce costs.’”  Id. at 1298 (alteration in original).  The FTC regarded the 
document as “unenforceable, illusory or inadequate.”  The court, however, found it to 
be consistent with pledges from the hospitals’ chairmen (who “have community inter-
ests at heart”) that the merger was intended to lower health care costs, improve quality, 
and enhance consumer welfare.  See id. at 1297, 1302.  These conclusions were also 
consistent with observations the judge himself made during tours of the hospitals, 
which convinced him that the hospitals were “well-maintained” and that the Board of 
Directors would adhere to their “fiduciary responsibilities” to renovate and upgrade 
their facilities.  Id. at 1301. 
 There is an important but unappreciated irony in the judiciary’s confidence in 
pledges by local business leaders to contain health care costs.  Labor economists have 
consistently found that even though employers purchase most health coverage for 
their employees, the full costs are ultimately shouldered by employees, principally in 
the form of reduced wages.  See Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market 
55 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (reviewing the 
empirical literature and concluding that “the results that attempt to control for worker 
selection, firm selection, or (ideally) both, have produced a fairly uniform result:  the 
costs of health insurance are fully shifted to wages”). 
44 FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *3 (6th Cir. 
July 8, 1997). 
45 Greaney, supra note 3, at 188. 
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that Butterworth “push[ed] the envelope of antitrust enforcement with 
an adherence to a paradigm of the health care industry that is, at 
least, in tension with the pro-market mandate of antitrust law and, at 
most, fundamentally inconsistent with the dictates of antitrust law.”46  
This critic warned further that the ruling “may undermine the ability 
of the enforcement agencies to apply the procompetitive policies of 
the antitrust law—for all their substantive and symbolic importance—
to an important component of the health care marketplace.”47  Sev-
eral scholars also lamented the court’s reliance on Lynk’s scholarship, 
which was heavily criticized in subsequent studies.48
46 Blumstein, supra note 3, at 117.  Though academic defenders of Butterworth were 
fewer in number, some did weigh in, including one who praised the court for using 
expert testimony and empirical evidence to “reconsider[] old presumptions in the 
light of new evidence.”  Michael S. Jacobs, Presumptions, Damn Presumptions and Eco-
nomic Theory:  The Role of Empirical Evidence in Hospital Merger Analysis, 31 IND. L. REV. 
125, 142 (1998).  For a more nuanced view that is sympathetic to the emerging trend 
and supportive of a flexible application of antitrust laws to nonprofit hospitals, see 
Thomas L. Greaney, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers:  Does the Nonprofit Form Affect Competi-
tive Substance?, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 511, 527 (2006) (“[C]ourts might be well 
advised . . . [to] keep open the possibility of fashioning new presumptive rules tailored 
to more complete economic accounts of nonprofit firm behavior.”). 
47 Blumstein, supra note 3, at 117. 
48 Questions over Lynk’s work, and the importance of the debate, prompted the 
Journal of Health Economics to dedicate three of its January 1999 articles to investigating 
the matter in greater detail—two by scholars who criticized Lynk’s findings and a third 
in which Lynk and a coauthor could respond to Lynk’s critics.  Most of the scholarly 
attention was directed at Lynk’s examination of simulated hospital mergers using 1989 
California pricing data.  See supra note 41.  One article was able to replicate Lynk’s 
findings but arrived at opposite results after making small methodological changes; it 
also discovered from data over several years that price increases from merging non-
profits grew larger over time.  See Emmett B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Compe-
tition on Non-Profit and For-Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 83 
(1999).  The second article argued that two sources of bias led to Lynk’s results and, 
after introducing adjustments, concluded that mergers of nonprofit hospitals are asso-
ciated with, “[i]f anything,” higher prices than mergers of for-profits.  David Dranove 
& Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals:  A Reassessment of 
Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 97 (1999).  Lynk’s response attributed the con-
flicting findings to methodological differences, but he also emphasized that his 1995 
paper was modest in its normative conclusions, noting that the “policy question that 
[his earlier] work addresses is simply whether the distinction between for-profit and 
nonprofit ownership matters, and therefore whether informed antitrust review of pro-
posed hospital mergers should add that consideration to the checklist of other relevant 
considerations.”  William J. Lynk & Lynette R. Neumann, Price and Profit, 18 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 99, 100-01 (1999).  Echoing his 1995 call for a case-by-case analysis, Lynk urged 
that determining nonprofit hospital pricing behavior remained an open empirical 
question.  Id. at 111. 
 The debate over whether nonprofit and for-profit hospitals price differently re-
mains lively, though most studies dispute Lynk’s findings and do not support a case-by-
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In addition to carving out a generous antitrust exemption, Butter-
worth also lent support to those who argued that judges have a deep-
seated hostility to subjecting health care providers to competition.  
The ruling concluded with some revealing language:  “[m]anaged 
care organizations’ interest in maintaining a competitive edge cannot 
be allowed to trump either hospitals’ conscientious endeavors to con-
tinue to provide comprehensive, high quality health care in this rap-
idly evolving field, or the consuming public’s right to receive the 
same.”49  Thus, the court concluded simply that competition itself 
does not serve the public interest.  To the contrary, it entrusted mar-
ket power to the directors of nonprofit hospitals and concluded that 
case approach.  See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text; see also John Simpson, 
FTC & Richard Shin, U.S. DOJ, Do Nonprofit Hospitals Exercise Market Power? 15-16 (FTC 
Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 214, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/ 
workpapers/wp214.pdf (concluding that nonprofit hospitals in concentrated markets 
set prices that are statistically indistinguishable from those set by for-profits). 
49 946 F. Supp. at 1302.  The court then issued an even more sweeping indictment 
of market forces, counterintuitively arguing that competition had impeded the realiza-
tion of certain efficiencies: 
Permitting defendant hospitals to achieve the efficiencies of scale that would 
clearly result from the proposed merger would enable the board of directors 
of the combined entity to continue the quest for establishment of world-class 
health facilities in West Michigan, a course the Court finds clearly and un-
equivocally would ultimately be in the best interests of the consuming public 
as a whole. 
Id.  The court’s hostile language could alternatively be interpreted to issue a narrower 
indictment of the competitive pressures brought by managed care organizations 
(MCOs).  The court could have been responding to an argument advanced at trial:  
that MCOs might negotiate lower prices for their own subscribers and thereby indi-
rectly increase prices for all other consumers.  Thus, rather than expressing hostility to 
competition writ large, the court might have been suggesting that the competition in-
troduced by MCOs is detrimental because it helps some but hurts others.  And in re-
marking that “the interests of managed care organizations, as health care intermediar-
ies, pale in comparison with those of the actual health care consuming public,” id., the 
court perhaps was merely placing greater value on the welfare of certain consumers 
and providers than on the benefits competition brought to MCOs. 
 Nonetheless, there is also reason to interpret the court’s language as a broad con-
demnation of competition in the health care sector:  MCOs were the primary sources 
of price competition; the court explicitly asserted that “even though competition may 
be lessened, the interests of consumers are, under the unique circumstances of this 
case, likely to be advanced rather than hurt,” id.; and the court’s reasoning relies, 
above all, on the presumed altruism of nonprofit entities, their boards, and certain 
pledges they made to expand output. 
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the public benefits most when such hospitals grow and dominate a 
market.50
Wounded by its resounding defeat in Butterworth and its other 
court losses, the FTC assembled a counterpunch in its 2004 report, 
Improving Health Care:  A Dose of Competition.51  Gathering scholarly tes-
timony on hospital pricing behavior, the report first shares William 
Lynk’s testimony before the Commission, discussing his empirical 
work and his repeated conclusion “that nonprofits that attain market 
power behave differently from for-profits when it comes to pricing.”52  
The report then continues, “By contrast, several panelists maintained 
that the best available empirical evidence indicated no significant dif-
ferences between the pricing behavior of for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals.”53  And, after listing the growing number of studies that 
reach that conclusion,54 the report concludes, 
Although institutional status has loomed large in debates and legal dis-
putes, the best available evidence indicates that nonprofits exploit mar-
ket power when given the opportunity to do so.  Accordingly, the 
profit/nonprofit status of the merging hospitals should not be consid-
ered a factor in predicting whether a hospital merger is likely to be anti-
competitive.
55
50 This same hostility was reflected in Freeman as well.  In orally denying the FTC’s 
motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proposed merger, the Freeman 
court had even harsher words for FTC officials: 
I don’t feel that the Federal Trade Commission has shown sufficient factual 
basis that they are entitled to a TRO. . . . I don’t think you’ve got any business 
being in here.  I don’t see how the Federal Trade Commission can claim there 
is lack of competition when there [are] four or five hospitals in the area, and 
reducing it by one is not going to wipe out competition. . . . It looks to me like 
Washington D.C. once again thinks they know better what’s going on in 
southwest Missouri.  I think they ought to stay in D.C. 
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1995) (alteration and omissions in 
original) (quoting from the district court’s oral denial of the temporary restraining 
order). 
51
 A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12. 
52 Id. ch. 4, at 31. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. ch. 4, at 31-33 nn.166-79.  The studies listed, in addition to those cited above, 
include:  Robert Connor et al., The Effects of Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers 
on Hospital Costs and Prices, 5 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 159 (1998); Elaine Silverman & Jona-
than Skinner, Medicare Upcoding and Hospital Ownership, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 369 
(2004); and Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospi-
tal Mergers:  A Case Study, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 63 (2001). 
55
 A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 33. 
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The FTC’s assertive language is a transparent effort to bring an 
end to the Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth legacy,56 even though it is un-
clear how far the trilogy advanced in carving out an established doc-
trine.  While the cases cited and built upon each other, their lenient 
antitrust approach has been neither recognized by a circuit court nor 
acknowledged by Judge Posner in his recent academic writings.57  Un-
fortunately, the entire debate that worked its way through the litiga-
tion, the academy, and into the FTC report has focused on a question 
that is secondary, and possibly irrelevant, to antitrust analysis.  Even as 
the courts regularly displayed wide-ranging antagonism to antitrust ac-
tions against nonprofit hospitals, their approvals of proposed mergers 
rested, in part, on finding that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals ex-
hibit different pricing behaviors.  The FTC report, understandably 
aiming to refute the conclusions and scholarship that motivated these 
judicial opinions, focused on the same narrow question and thus in-
advertently contributed to moving the debate toward a myopic and 
unconstructive target.  The debate has allowed antitrust analysis to 
stray from what should be the focus. 
Attention should instead focus on the consequences of nonprofit 
market power and whether market power in the hands of nonprofit 
hospitals is socially undesirable (regardless of whether it is more or 
less desirable than market power in the hands of for-profits).  Investi-
gating this question could lead to a meaningful examination of how 
market power combines with health insurance, affects output, and en-
ables cross-subsidies.  Refocusing the analysis in this direction is the 
first step toward a return to antitrust principles. 
II.  A RETURN TO PRINCIPLES:  UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE,  
MORAL HAZARD, AND CROSS-SUBSIDIES 
A confidence that nonprofit hospitals’ market concentration does 
not lead to higher prices largely drives judicial sympathy for nonprof-
its in merger cases, and in turn a tolerance of nonprofits’ market 
power.  This view is not entirely unfounded, and the courts in Carilion, 
56 At around the same time the FTC released its report, it launched a new attack in 
this battle against nonprofit hospital mergers and initiated its complaint against Evans-
ton Northwestern Healthcare.  See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text. 
57 See, e.g., Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit  
Sector 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12132, 2006) 
(“[D]efendants will often argue that their [nonprofit] status entitles them either to an 
outright exemption from antitrust scrutiny or to a different, more permissive standard 
of liability.  These arguments fail.”). 
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Freeman, and Butterworth relied on expert testimony and some aca-
demic scholarship to reach their conclusions that nonprofits would 
not impose monopoly prices.58  But this is altogether the wrong focus.  
Instead, attention should concentrate on prices, output, and effi-
ciency.  Even as the structural complexity of the health care system is 
unbundled, a return to antitrust’s central principles reveals a surpris-
ingly straightforward analysis. 
A.  The Effects on Prices:  Market Power Plus U.S.-Style Health Insurance 
With courts focusing on potential differences between for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals, the antitrust debate has unfortunately re-
volved around, and has devolved into, the question of whether non-
profit hospitals set prices differently from for-profits.  The primary 
problem with this approach is that the baseline question is how a for-
profit monopolist would price, when the concern should be whether 
nonprofits exploit market power at all. 
There is good reason to believe that market power yields espe-
cially pernicious consequences in the U.S. health care market, regard-
less of whether the owner of such market power is for-profit or non-
profit.  Understanding the exploitation of market power in this 
industry requires appreciating the critical role of health insurance in 
determining market prices. 
U.S.-style health insurance offers health care services to insureds 
for a copayment that is far below the actual price charged for the de-
sired care.  It has long been understood that insurance of this sort 
creates a moral hazard, which induces those with insurance to con-
sume more than they otherwise would if they faced market prices.59  
But insurance also means that providers face consumers who are sig-
nificantly less price conscious, and thus present a steeper and less elas-
tic demand curve.60  In a competitive market for health care services, 
the pervasiveness of insurance would likely have little effect on the 
prices ultimately charged by providers, since competing providers 
would drive the price charged down toward the marginal cost.61  In a 
58 See supra notes 25, 34, 41, and accompanying text. 
59 See, e.g., CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 116 (3d ed. 2003). 
60 Id. at 117 (noting that insurance “makes the demand curve less elastic in gen-
eral”). 
61 However, it is possible that, if the marginal cost curve of a particular service is 
upward sloping, insurance could increase the equilibrium market price by stimulating 
demand. 
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concentrated market, however, providers facing a steep demand curve 
will set prices where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, which 
would be at prices that are even higher than monopoly prices would 
be in the absence of insurance.  Many assume that consumers’ lack of 
price sensitivity is overcome by their heavy reliance on private insurers 
acting as informed, aggressive purchasing agents that can negotiate 
providers’ prices downward to competitive levels.62  But even if health 
insurers can leverage their scale economies and industry expertise to 
stimulate competition and negotiate attractive prices with some pro-
viders, they are toothless against a true monopolist.  Effective bargain-
ing against a monopolist provider would require insurers to threaten 
not to cover a service that, by definition, has no adequate substitute, 
and any such refusal would come into tension with the pervasive legal 
requirement to cover all “medically necessary” care.63  Even if insurers 
overcome regulatory and legal hurdles, those who refuse to cover any 
such service subject themselves to likely lawsuits, angry protests, and 
the scorn of judges who accuse them of saving dollars rather than 
human life.64
62 See Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ven-
tures:  An Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989, 997 (2004). 
63 See Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1523, 1528-29 
(2005) (arguing that technology costs are uncontrolled, in part, because insurers do 
not enjoy the contractual freedom to exclude coverage for expensive care); Clark C. 
Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
2002, at 55, 73 (lamenting that managed care organizations do not enjoy the legal abil-
ity to limit coverage to care that meets appropriate cost-benefit benchmarks).  On the 
pervasiveness of the “medically necessary” standard, and its effect on limiting the abil-
ity to constrain health care costs, see Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical Necessity” Determi-
nations—A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 623-24 (2004); 
Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1525, 1549-51 (1996); and William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea:  Medical Neces-
sity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 597, 605-09 (2003). 
64 Recall the Butterworth court’s admonition to the FTC that “[i]n the real world, 
hospitals are in the business of saving lives, and managed care organizations are in the 
business of saving dollars.”  FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 
(W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997).  
Managed care organizations were consumed by a political firestorm in the 1990s when 
they were accused of “rationing” arguably beneficial care.  See Michael E. Chernew et 
al., Barriers to Constraining Health Care Cost Growth, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 
122, 127-28 (noting that “the backlash against managed care” could “limit the effec-
tiveness of . . . managed competition”); Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care:  A 
Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 427, 427 (2005) (discussing state regu-
lations enacted in the late 1990s and the managed care industry’s “retreat” from the 
use of “key cost-containment techniques”). 
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These observations force the conclusion that “U.S.-style private 
health insurance, by greatly weakening price elasticity of demand as a 
constraint on monopoly pricing by health care providers and suppli-
ers, facilitates the latter’s exercise of market power, producing profits 
substantially exceeding the usual returns to lawful monopoly.”65  This 
has significant implications for antitrust policy.  Though it belabors 
the obvious, it is worth emphasizing that inflated prices are a founda-
tional target for antitrust policy,66 and policing the health care indus-
try is of heightened importance if monopoly power in that sector leads 
to prices that are even more inflated than monopolies in other indus-
tries.  However objectionable market concentration might normally 
be, health sector concentration combined with health insurance is 
cause for particular alarm. 
Thus, the emphasis on the significance of corporate form—which 
has preoccupied the courts—is highly misplaced.  Even assuming that 
nonprofit hospitals with market power set prices statistically lower 
than for-profit hospitals with equal market power, it would be prema-
ture—and grossly inaccurate—to conclude that merger review should 
be permissive.  To the contrary, the presence of health insurance 
means that hospital market power—whether held by nonprofits or for-
profits—is a cause for great alarm and deserves heightened antitrust 
scrutiny.  Rather than focusing on corporate form, empirical scrutiny 
should focus on the economic consequences of combining market 
power with health insurance.  The crucial test to determine whether 
nonprofit-hospital market concentration is benign is to compare non-
profit-hospital pricing in the presence of market power to nonprofit-
hospital pricing in the absence of market power.  Since health insur-
ance affects consumers’ price sensitivities, such a study would likely 
reveal a significant difference.  A second empirical test would examine 
the effect of insurance on prices.  For example, it would study 
whether, under conditions of market concentration, medical services 
that typically are not insured—such as elective cosmetic surgery—
65 Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American 
Health Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 7, 30. 
66 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784-85 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a restraint’s likely effect on prices will de-
termine whether it is anticompetitive); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 50 (3d ed. 2005) (discuss-
ing the suggestion that “the primary intent of the Sherman Act’s framer” may have 
been “the distributive goal of preventing monopolists from transferring wealth away 
from consumers” in the form of higher prices). 
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exhibit smaller mark-ups than insured services.67  These tests could de-
termine the actual effect of insurance on health care prices, and thus 
might usefully inform antitrust policymakers as to when they should 
be concerned, and when they should be very concerned, about pock-
ets of market power. 
Given the potent combination of health insurance and market 
concentration in the health sector, it is a matter of significant concern 
that many services in the health care industry are highly concen-
trated.68  But the FTC’s concern with growing industry concentration 
in the health care sector, and its desperate call for greater competi-
tion,69 does not specify why hospital consolidations should evoke such 
alarm.  It is the specific combination of U.S.-style health insurance with 
health care provider market power that demands remedial attention, 
with health insurance both reshaping and reemphasizing the problem 
of market power.  Whether the monopolist is nonprofit can be only 
marginally relevant.  Of far greater antitrust concern is whether the 
monopolist serves a market covered by insurance. 
B.  The Effects on Output:  The Antitrust of Overconsumption 
In addition to the pervasiveness of insurance, a second prominent 
feature of the U.S. health care landscape is the tax exclusion of insur-
ance premiums.  Compensation paid to workers in the form of em-
ployer-paid health insurance premiums is excluded from both indi-
viduals’ taxable income and employers’ payroll taxes.70  Consequently, 
it is mutually beneficial for both employers and employees to create 
compensation packages that substitute income for generous health 
insurance, causing individuals to purchase health coverage that is 
more generous than they otherwise would purchase without the tax 
subsidy.71
67 A correlation between mark-ups and insurance, however, might be confounded 
by variations on demand elasticity.  Services for which there is elastic demand would, 
by definition, exhibit smaller mark-ups for a given degree of market concentration,  
and it is possible that these services are also less likely to receive insurance coverage. 
68 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
69 See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 1. 
70 For an overview and critique of the health-related tax exclusions, and a proposal 
for reform, see PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, 
AND PRO-GROWTH:  PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 78-82 (2005), available at 
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/. 
71 Id. at 80.  The panel emphasized that “tax preferences for health care represent 
the largest tax expenditure and have an outsized impact on health care spending in 
America.”  Id. at 79. 
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Even unsubsidized health insurance, by presenting insureds with 
copayments that are a fraction of market prices, induces individuals to 
consume more than they otherwise would without insurance.72  By 
subsidizing the purchase of health insurance, the tax exclusion leads 
to insurance benefits that even further reduce copayments and ex-
pand coverage of health services.  Thus, despite widespread provider 
market power—enjoyed by nonprofits and for-profits alike—and the 
pervasiveness of supracompetitive prices,73 U.S.-style insurance subsi-
dizes demand and maintains the moral hazard problem of overcon-
sumption.  Thus, America’s health system faces the sad irony that mo-
nopoly prices, and even “supramonopoly” prices, do not prompt 
reductions in consumption of medical services.  To the contrary, the 
tax subsidy and U.S.-style insurance overcome any depressive effect on 
demand that monopoly prices would normally have. 
Perhaps the stimulating effect of subsidized insurance on con-
sumption should be applauded.  If the traditional antitrust concern 
over rising prices is that they lead to a reduction in output,74 then 
health insurance’s stimulation of demand despite the presence of mo-
nopolies might be reason to restrain, rather than reinvigorate, anti-
trust scrutiny in this area.  The health care industry, however, is an in-
stance in which maximizing output does not translate into maximizing 
total surplus.  This has been labeled the “too much of a good thing” 
problem.75  Even though rising prices might not reduce total output—
and, in fact, total output might even achieve theoretically optimal lev-
els if insurance copayments are set at the marginal costs to deliver 
care—there are instead severe allocative inefficiencies, which are cer-
tainly a matter of antitrust concern.76  Since insurance-facilitated 
72 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra note 13. 
74 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-08 (1984) (“Restrictions on 
price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the 
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (“[O]ur inquiry must focus on . . . whether the practice 
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competi-
tion and decrease output . . . .”). 
75 Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 24. 
76 See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 (commenting that being “unresponsive to con-
sumer preference . . . is perhaps the most significant [anticompetitive consequence], 
since Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY 
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1978) (“The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the 
effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”). 
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moral hazard induces individuals to consume services they otherwise 
would forgo,77 the ultimate price consumers pay for such services (in-
cluding the appropriate portion of their insurance premiums) ex-
ceeds what consumers would otherwise choose for themselves in the 
presence of a well-working market and in the absence of insurance.78  
With such distortions on price, and their mute effect on consumption 
behavior, the costs of many services likely far exceed the surplus they 
generate. 
Moreover, subsidized insurance and the resulting overconsump-
tion create severe dynamic inefficiencies.  Health care providers ex-
pand costly services with the confidence that most of the visible costs 
will be covered by insurance, and they have little incentive to meet 
consumer benefit-cost priorities because the subsidized moral hazard 
problem prevents consumers from being appropriately cost conscious.  
In addition, providers make ambitious investments to deliver newer 
and costlier services that are unlikely to enhance overall welfare but 
are nonetheless profitable to providers.79  Health policy experts agree 
that investments in new health care technologies, whose profitability 
has been virtually guaranteed by comprehensive health insurance, are 
the primary culprit for escalating health care costs.80
Consequently, moral hazard and subsequent overconsumption do 
not correct for the antitrust problems created by inflated prices; 
rather, because they induce inefficient expenditures despite those 
prices, and because they institute inefficient incentives to overinvest in 
future health care consumption, they are additional reasons for alarm.  
These harms of overconsumption have important implications for an-
titrust law since they suggest that antitrust policies should take steps to 
stem the proliferation of output.  But courts, to the contrary, are se-
duced by such pledges to expand output, and overconsumption is 
ironically applauded.  In fact, the harms of overconsumption often re-
77 See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 31 (describing “the tendency of in-
surance to induce consumption that would not otherwise occur”). 
78 This is particularly true when one considers the dynamic consequences of moral 
hazard, whereby subsidized demand stimulates investments in expensive new tech-
nologies in which many consumers would prefer not to invest.  See id. at 25-27; see also 
Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Distribution of 
Well-Being, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 83, 100. 
79 See Pauly, supra note 78, at 100 (arguing that “the health-insurance tax subsidy 
harms low-income people in a dynamic context by fueling the already-present eager-
ness on the part of higher-income people to have access to the latest, expensive tech-
nology”). 
80 See AARON, supra note 12, at 48-49. 
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inforce supracompetitive pricing, since nonprofits have successfully 
justified their supracompetitive prices by claiming a need to finance 
additional activities, such as charity care and research.  The Butterworth 
court, for example, relaxed its antitrust scrutiny in part because the 
merging entities pledged to invest in new facilities and “to provide 
quality healthcare programs for the underserved without regard to 
ability to pay.”81  One year later, a New York court—relying heavily on 
the Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth trilogy—approved a merger between 
nonprofit hospitals in part because the merged entity promised to ex-
pend an additional $50 million “to provide high quality health care to 
economically disadvantaged and elderly members of the commu-
nity.”82  However admirable such activities might be, they do not war-
rant amnesty from the antitrust laws.  Unfortunately, such assurances 
have become a common tactic to solicit community support and judi-
cial sympathy, even though they reduce the efficiency of health care 
investments and further damage the market for health care services.  
By lending credence to, and perhaps even encouraging, pledges by 
merging entities to invest in new health care delivery, these courts and 
others have enabled a substantial departure from antitrust princi-
ples.83
If allocative efficiency is of any antitrust concern, courts scrutiniz-
ing proposed mergers of nonprofits should consider such investments 
in additional output as a reason to oppose, not support, the mergers.  
Increases in output of this sort survive only because of insurance sub-
sidies and other rents, not because they enhance the efficiency of the 
market and direct resources to best meet society’s needs. 
C.  The Effects of Cost-Shifting:  The Antitrust of Cross-Subsidies 
In addition to inflating prices and facilitating overconsumption, 
nonprofit hospitals’ accrual of market power imposes additional inef-
ficiencies that are closely connected to their nonprofit status.  These 
harms are motivated by the nondistribution constraint, the founda-
81 FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300, 1306 (W.D. Mich. 
1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997). 
82 United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
83 An admirable exception, in which a court did recognize that promising addi-
tional output and investments do not excuse an antitrust violation, is United States v. 
Rockford Memorial Corp.  See 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that the 
stated intention of the merging hospitals “to create a state-of-the-art tertiary referral 
center” is irrelevant to the antitrust inquiry), aff’d, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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tional rule in the U.S. tax code that prohibits the nonprofit organiza-
tion from distributing net earnings to any individual or shareholder.84  
The tax code does not, however, prohibit nonprofits from exacting 
positive margins on certain services, and (as discussed above) non-
profits display a strong inclination to charge whatever prices the mar-
ket will bear.85  To accommodate the nondistribution constraint, non-
profits have been shown to adjust discretionary spending in other 
health care activities (rather than reducing prices) such that their net 
earnings approximate zero.86
Thus, any surplus gained by nonprofit hospitals must remain 
within the health care system, causing those institutions to plow their 
excess earnings back into the health care enterprise.87  These rents 
proceed to fund the many activities that the hospital’s leaders deem 
worthy, such as uncompensated and undercharged care for indigent 
and low-income patients (including adjustments for underpayments 
by Medicare and Medicaid) as well as less munificent services, such as 
discounted medical instruction, research, and loss-leaders in growing 
markets that might translate into future market power and lucrative 
services.88  In short, nonprofit hospitals create their own intricate 
84 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (limiting nonprofit status to entities “no part of the 
net earnings of which inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”). 
85 See supra notes 48 & 54-55 and accompanying text. 
86 See, e.g., Andrew J. Leone & R. Lawrence Van Horn, How Do Nonprofit Hospitals 
Manage Earnings?, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 815, 835 (2005).  The nondistribution con-
straint and resulting cross-subsidies also suggest that even if one accepts the FTC’s 
conclusion that “nonprofits exploit market power when given the opportunity to do 
so,” A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 12, ch. 4, at 33, a nonprofit’s supracompeti-
tive prices for some services will by necessity translate into reductions in prices for oth-
ers.  In other words, nonprofit hospitals and for-profits do, in fact, price slightly differ-
ently from each other, even if those pricing differences do not mitigate the harms 
imposed by nonprofit power. 
87 There is also substantial evidence for the converse, that as competition increases 
and nonprofit hospitals are forced to charge competitive prices, nonprofits reduce 
their expenditures on uncompensated care.  See Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of Competi-
tive Pressure on Charity:  Hospital Responses to Price Shopping in California, 38 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 183, 208 (1994).  However, at least one study has concluded that charity care 
does not increase even as competition is reduced, thus offering “no support to the 
claim made by some that hospital mergers lead to benefits for uninsured patients 
through cross-subsidization from insured patients.”  Christopher Garmon, Hospital 
Competition and Charity Care 6 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 285, 2006), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp285.pdf. 
88 Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 22-23. 
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world of cross-subsidies, in which the excess earnings from some ser-
vices finance activities that the market would not otherwise support.89
Though a nonprofit’s inflation of some prices while reducing oth-
ers can itself be objectionable under antitrust principles if it facilitates 
inefficient consumption,90 pervasive cross-subsidies invite an addi-
tional antitrust concern.  Unlike for-profit monopolies, which can 
channel their rents into efficient, market-driven uses, nonprofits are 
restrained to expend their monopoly rents within the health care sys-
tem regardless of how efficient or inefficient such investments might 
be.  This system of cross-subsidies has always been a cornerstone of the 
operation of nonprofit hospitals.  Several studies indicate that non-
profit hospitals are more likely than for-profits to pursue new expen-
sive technologies with uncertain returns.91  Moreover, a former 
prominent health care policymaker, conceding that “[h]ospitals in 
the United States have engaged in internal cross-subsidization 
throughout their history,” warned that subjecting hospitals to in-
creased competition would endanger their ability to provide the 
community services that governments have traditionally avoided pay-
ing for themselves.92  A sympathetic observer might characterize these 
cross-subsidies as the channeling of excess revenues into admirable, 
socially beneficial health care activities.  A proper antitrust perspec-
tive, however, recognizes that these fund transfers support activities 
that are not demanded by the market, are unsustainable absent gen-
89 It is entirely possible that the surplus from supracompetitive prices is whittled 
away by inflated salaries, administrative inefficiencies, or undesired quality improve-
ments.  See id. (“[I]n the absence of either market discipline or effective political over-
sight, there is no assurance that easily gained revenues will not be squandered in low-
priority activities, in overpaying for inputs, or simply through managerial slack.”).  But 
this kind of waste can itself be characterized as a subsidy.  See id. at 18-19.  Also, there is 
some (contested) evidence suggesting that nonprofit hospitals have lower costs and 
larger efficiencies than for-profits.  See Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Performance 
Evaluations of For-Profit and Nonprofit U.S. Hospitals Since 1980, 13 NONPROFIT MGMT. & 
LEADERSHIP 401, 407 (2003). 
90 See supra Part II.B. 
91 See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 175 
(2007) (finding that nonprofit hospitals provide services that are unlikely to be offered 
by for-profits); Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, Why Nonprofits Matter in American 
Medicine:  A Policy Brief 10-11 (The Aspen Inst., Nonprofit Sector Research Fund Work-
ing Paper Series, 2005), available at http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/nsr_doc/ 
Healthcare.pdf (praising nonprofit hospitals for serving “as the incubator for entirely 
new services . . . for which payment systems have not been regularized” and for being 
“slower [than for-profits] to react to changing conditions”). 
92 Bruce C. Vladeck, Paying for Hospitals’ Community Service, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34, 34 
(2006). 
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erous subsidies, and are therefore not efficient market-driven uses for 
valuable resources.  If any of these activities are deemed socially desir-
able public goods and worthy of public support—and many undoubt-
edly are—then they should be supported by public institutions follow-
ing a transparent and accountable public debate, not through carved-
out exceptions to the antitrust laws that entrust paternalistic power to 
a few private actors. 93
Cross-subsidies have not escaped the notice of courts, which have 
correctly understood that nonprofit hospitals gather surplus through 
supracompetitive pricing and spend it on excess health care.  How-
ever, these practices have served as reasons to approve a merger, not 
reasons to reject one.  In some recent merger cases, courts have even 
made explicit allowances for, and imposed implicit requirements on, 
nonprofit hospitals to engage in cross-subsidies.  For example, in 
permitting two nonprofit hospitals to merge in 1997, the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York explained that 
both hospitals provide millions of dollars worth of free medical care to 
individuals in need.  Any profit is funneled back into the community in 
the form of new programs and facilities. . . . All of these beneficial fac-
tors support the defendants’ contention that community service[,] not 
profit maximization, is the hospitals’ mission.
94
Thus, the hospitals’ cross-subsidies helped defend a merger, 
rather than serving as a troubling indication that the hospitals enjoyed 
market power.  But this allowance is a departure from the central 
economic goals of antitrust law.  Antitrust law has not recognized as a 
legitimate defense a claim by an otherwise illegal monopolist or cartel 
that its economic rents are spent toward socially useful applications,95 
93 Another reason for objecting to financing hospital activities through cross-
subsidies is their regressive impact on working-class individuals.  Privately financed 
health care is predominantly supported through health insurance premiums, which 
fall equally upon all insured individuals, regardless of income, akin to a head tax.  Pub-
lic financing for socially desirable health care spending would be supported though a 
far more progressive system of taxation.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 65, at 
28-29. 
94 United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
95 But see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing 
“the undisputed public interest in equality of educational access and opportunity” to 
be considered as justification for a group of colleges’ collusion on financial aid).  For 
criticisms of Brown University, see Lee Goldman, The Politically Correct Corporation and the 
Antitrust Laws:  The Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications Under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 148 (1995) (“Even assuming 
that the defendants genuinely intend to benefit the public, they still cannot be trusted 
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and arguments by nonprofit hospitals to justify their monopoly rents 
should be met with similar skepticism.  If courts were to evaluate pro-
posed mergers with a focus on allocative efficiency, antitrust law could 
play a constructive role in ending the misallocation of significant so-
cial resources and encouraging a transparent debate over how to fi-
nance public needs. 
Of course, disassembling the health care industry’s system of cross-
subsidies would be a daunting task.  The system is deeply rooted in ac-
counting and delivery systems, and the powerful industry is highly in-
centivized to do what it can to maintain control over its captured 
rents.  But more importantly, the system of cross-subsidies enjoys the 
thorough protection of several legal authorities and has become part 
of the very fabric that defines nonprofit status.  Even the earliest IRS 
revenue rulings determining whether hospitals were exempt from pay-
ing taxes hinged upon the maintenance of a healthy system of cross-
subsidies.  For example, in commenting on the seminal Revenue Rul-
ing 56-185,96 which provided a list of “requirements” for the exemp-
tion of a nonprofit hospital, one noted expert on tax-exempt organi-
zations observed: 
to balance properly the asserted public interest benefits against the resulting harms to 
competition so long as they receive direct financial advantages.”). 
96 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (interpreting § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code and listing requirements for hospitals to qualify for tax-exempt status).  
Battles over the interpretation of § 501(c)(3) and the granting of tax-exempt status to 
hospitals have been the source of heated and sustained litigation.  Part of the problem 
is that the section and its associated revenue rulings impose vague and unspecific stan-
dards, but the granting of tax-exempt status also involves big dollars and emotional 
politics.  For example, when the 1956 ruling required nonprofits to provide uncom-
pensated care “to the extent of its financial ability,” the industry protested and earned 
in 1969 the less demanding requirement to provide a “benefit to the community.”  
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see also David M. Studdert et al., Regulatory and Judi-
cial Oversight of Nonprofit Hospitals, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 625, 626 (2007).  Relatedly, 
“[m]ore than 100 lawsuits have been filed accusing [nonprofit hospitals] of shirking 
their charitable commitments by charging uninsured patients high fees and then pur-
suing these ‘debts.’”  Id. at 625.  The topic’s political salience has made it a favorite 
subject for politicians, and both Congress and the executive branch are considering 
alternatives to the community benefit standard in order to extract more uncompen-
sated care from nonprofits.  See, e.g.,  Sen. Grassley Questions Tax Status of Nonprofit Hospi-
tals, May Seek Legislation, 15 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1048, 1048 (Sept. 14, 2006) (re-
counting a senator’s “stinging rebuke to the nation’s nonprofit hospitals” for “in some 
cases do[ing] less than for-profit institutions in providing charity care”); IRS Interim 
Report Should Address Community Benefit, Treasury IG Says, 16 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 491, 
492 (Apr. 19, 2007) (quoting one observer as saying that “exempt hospitals remain the 
focus of congressional, IRS, and other federal governmental concern and scrutiny”). 
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[T]he ruling explained that such a hospital “must be operated to the ex-
tent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the services ren-
dered . . . .” The clear implication of the paragraph was that an exempt 
hospital was expected to engage in more or less explicit cross-
subsidization among patient groups, with those who could afford treat-
ment paying for the total costs of operating the hospital, including costs 
attributable to care for those who could not afford to pay the full costs, if 
they could indeed afford to pay anything at all.
97
Cross-subsidies continue to remain at the heart of nonprofit status 
in the health care sector—but again as something the law requires, 
not as something deemed undesirable.  For example, when a group of 
health maintenance organizations sought nonprofit status, they en-
countered hostility when they suggested that they deserved the tax ex-
emption because they could provide care at more competitive costs.98  
Instead, the IRS and a recent Tenth Circuit ruling demanded “some 
additional ‘plus.’”99  One commentator explained that “[t]he amor-
phous ‘plus’ factor can vary, but the Tenth Circuit suggested that de-
voting surpluses to research or teaching, or providing free or below-
cost services, would normally qualify.”100
The great irony in these tax cases and revenue rulings is that an 
entity must exercise market power in order to implement the cross-
subsidies necessary to obtain tax exempt status; therefore, all entities 
that qualify for nonprofit status must necessarily exercise some market 
power.  But this irony, and the implicit alarm it sounds to antitrust 
law, has largely been lost on the courts.  Whether applying antitrust 
law or tax law, courts have largely deemed market power of this sort to 
be admirable, and a reason to protect nonprofit hospitals from stan-
dard antitrust scrutiny.  A proper application of antitrust law would 
instead understand that extensive cross-subsidies are reasons to sub-
ject nonprofits to additional scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article issues a plea to courts to apply the most basic antitrust 
principles when reviewing challenges to proposed mergers of non-
profit hospitals.  Unpacking the complex web of health care financing 
reveals many inefficiencies that are exacerbated by nonprofit market 
97 Schmalbeck, supra note 22, at 124 (citation omitted). 
98 IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r., 325 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003). 
99 Id. at 1197 (citing Rev. Rul. 69-545).  The court also required that a nonprofit 
“make its services available to all in the community.”  Id. at 1198. 
100 Schmalbeck, supra note 22, at 128 (citing IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1197). 
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power, and a renewed emphasis on foundational antitrust princi-
ples—competitive prices, optimal output, and allocative efficiency—
would both challenge many predispositions toward nonprofit health 
care providers and lead to a far less permissive merger policy. 
Conveniently, this Article’s lessons translate into easily applied le-
gal rules.  It argues that merger law has been both muddied and weak-
ened when courts give inappropriate weight to factors such as a hospi-
tal’s nonprofit status, pledges to expand output, and promises for 
generous below-cost services financed by cross-subsidies.  A proper 
application of antitrust law would prevent courts from considering 
these factors and require them to proceed instead with a standard an-
titrust analysis.  This return to antitrust basics, in addition to simplify-
ing the court’s duties, complements the many other compelling rea-
sons for judges and juries to pay greater heed to the FTC’s merger 
challenges. 
It is possible that the FTC’s persistence might soon pay off and its 
record on hospital mergers could turn around.  Another chapter is 
now being written by In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., in 
which the FTC is challenging a merger of an academic hospital and a 
community hospital that since 2000 have been operated by a non-
profit corporation, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare (ENH).101  On 
August 7, 2007, the FTC Commissioners unanimously ruled that the 
merged entity created a highly concentrated market, increased hospi-
tal prices, harmed consumers, and thereby violated section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.102  Of great significance was the ruling’s rejection of the 
defendant’s proffered justifications for leniency from antitrust scru-
tiny.  In a repudiation of the Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth trilogy, the 
Commission tersely concluded that “ENH’s non-profit status did not 
affect its efforts to raise prices after the merger, and . . . does not suf-
fice to rebut complaint counsel’s evidence of anticompetitive ef-
fects.”103  Perhaps more significantly, the Commission dismissed 
ENH’s assertion that its merger was procompetitive because it spent 
101 See In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 5-7 (FTC Oct. 20, 2005) 
(initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
adjpro/d9315/051020initialdecision.pdf. 
102 In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 78 (FTC Aug. 6, 2007)  
(opinion of the Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/ 
070806opinion.pdf.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition of assets “in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the coun-
try, [where] the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly.”  15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). 
103 In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp. (opinion of the Commission) at 85. 
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over $120 million post-merger to make improvements and expand 
health care services, noting instead that quality improvements must 
result from cost-saving efficiencies to squarely warrant a justification.104  
It was an admirable recognition that enhanced output and the temp-
tation of cross subsidies do not outweigh the harm from (and are in 
fact products of) provider market power. 
The FTC’s decision to challenge the ENH merger retroactively has 
been described as “a renewed commitment to hospital merger en-
forcement.”105  Moreover, 
given how much the FTC has invested in this case in terms of time, re-
sources and reputation, [and] the importance of this case to the future 
of the FTC’s health care antitrust enforcement mission, the FTC cannot 
afford to reverse course. . . . The high stakes involved virtually guarantee 
that this case will continue to be hard-fought and is likely to become a 
bellwether of future government antitrust enforcement in hospital 
mergers.
106
But the FTC does not enjoy the final say, and if ENH decides to ap-
peal the Commission’s ruling, the case will fall into the hands of the 
judiciary.  How the courts will handle the case, and how they will ad-
dress the defendant’s justifications, might significantly shape merger 
law.  Hopefully, the courts will seize upon the opportunity to bring an 
end to the mistaken Carilion-Freeman-Butterworth trilogy, recognize 
the dangers of nonprofit market power, and restore foundational anti-
trust analysis in the market for hospital services. 
 
104 Id. at 81-82. 
105 Barak D. Richman, The Corrosive Combination of Nonprofit Monopolies and U.S.-Style 
Health Insurance:  Implications for Antitrust and Merger Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Autumn 2006, at 139, 146 (quoting Michael R. Bissegger, FTC ALJ Finds that Evanston 
Hospital Merger Violated Antitrust Law and Orders Divestiture (Oct. 28, 2005), 
http://www.ebglaw.com/article_1198.html). 
106 Id. at 146-47 (quoting Bissegger, supra note 105). 
